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G R A D U A T E S C H O O L

Thesis

THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION

Submitted By

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(A. B., Southwestern College, 1916)

In Partial fulfilment of requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts

1918

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O U T L I N E

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THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION

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A N A L Y S I S

THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION

Chapter I. Introduction.

The relation between religious and moral education is much debated. The problem before us is to discover the nature and extent of their relation.

In some quarters to-day, it is maintained that the time has come for a complete dissociation of moral education from religious education. But the Catholics claim that morality is a peculiarly Christian product, and that the Pope and the Church are infallible in matters of faith and morals.

It is due to this perplexing situation that Religious Education Association has been founded in America to inspire the educational forces of this country. The members of this Association recognize the essential place of religion in moral education.

Three methods have generally been employed to study this problem concerning the relationship of religious and moral education. These are, namely,

(1) the historical method, (2) the evolutional method, and (3) inquiry of the basic principles of religious and moral education. The historical method deals with the historical relation between religion and morality. The evolutional method reveals to us the process of growth and development of religion and morality. Both of them only confine themselves in the field of facts and descriptions; hence they fail to show the intrinsic principles of religion and morality. The true nature of the relationship of religion and morality can only be understood by studying their basic principles.

Chapter II. The Nature of Relation between Religious and Moral Education.

In our investigation of the relationship of religious and moral education, we shall begin by defining the nature of their relation,

Firstly, we find that religious and moral education are characterized by the objects with which they deal. The object of religious education is God; the object of moral education is the world. God is different from the world; hence religious education is different from moral education. But we find that God

is intimately related to the world, because we cannot understand the world without knowing the World Ground. The world is his manifestation. Thus religious and moral education are related, because we cannot understand one without the other.

Secondly, we find that religious and moral education are characterized from each other by the extent of their social outlook. The social outlook of religious education is much larger than that of ~~the~~ moral education, because religious education recognizes a social whole that comprised both God and man, while moral education only recognizes the society of man. But religious and moral education are related, because both aim at social adjustment. Moreover, the social outlook ~~of~~ that moral education deals with has the tendency toward ultimate realization in the Kingdom of God.

Thirdly, we find that religious and moral education are charcterized from each other by the value they give to personality. Religious education recognizes the spiritual part of man's nature; moral education ignores that. Religious education teaches that the destiny of man is immortality; moral education is silent on this question. This

antithesis is due to the imperfection of moral education, because an ideal system of moral education should ~~deal with~~ take recognition of the value and worth of man's life.

Chapter III. Moral Ideal Realized in God.

Although there is some formal distinction between religious and moral education, yet they have significant bond of relation, because both ~~the~~ religious and moral ideals find their realization in God. But we find some of the so-called "thorough-bred" moralists even do not believe that man's moral nature is an indication of his divine origin, far less will they accept a theory of the moral ideal and the truth that the moral ideal is realized in God. For this reason, we shall first show that their view about morality is faulty, because the social evolution theory on which they base their view is faulty. The defects of the social evolution theory are, that (1) something cannot come from nothing, (2) mere development and expansion cannot transform egoism to altruism, (3) serious inconsistency is shown in the social evolutionists' view about sympathy and public opinion,

and (4) the abstract moral sense cannot be developed from mere expansion of sympathy.

We find that the moral consciousness of right and wrong, speaking with a mandatory tone, in the imperative mood, cannot have its origin in selfishness. The moral nature of man is akin to the divine nature. This shows the relation between religious and moral education. But further reflection on the moral nature of man shows that a theory of the moral ideal is a necessary deduction from man's moral nature. It is not the result of philosophical speculation; it arises in response to our desire for unity and coherence of moral acts. Man is a rational being and his activities are acts for ends. Moreover without a theory of the moral ideal, moral freedom remains imperfect.

Now all the moral ideals must find their realization in God, because there is not any moral ideal that can find an ultimate basis here on earth, and because they are not absolute by themselves.

All the religious and moral ideals must be realized in God, because we find morality is triply rooted in our nature. Firstly, we are conscious of ourselves, and so we have the personal ideals.

Secondly, we are conscious of the world of things and persons, and so we have the social ideals. Thirdly, we are conscious of God, the Meaning and Being of all things, and so we have the religious ideals. But it is implied in our nature, that we should seek at one with ourselves, at one with our fellow men and have them at one with us, and at one with God.

Thus we clearly see the significant relation between religious education and moral education, because morality is intimately related to God, in whom are embodied all of our religious ideals that religious education deals with. Moreover, all duties are duties toward God. The fulfilment of duty toward God is a fulfilment of all other duties.

Chapter IV. An Ideal System of Moral Education Inseparable from Religious Education.

We have shown the significant relation between religious and moral education. We further see that an ideal system of moral education education is inseparable from religious education, because religious education ~~education~~ is the consummation of moral education, and because moral education remains imperfect

without including in its curriculum the elements of religious teaching.

Firstly, we notice that man has a religious impulse. The development and growth of this impulse is interwoven with those of the ethical ideals. The religious life and the moral life merge into each other and they cannot be separated. Man's conduct is largely conditioned by his religious convictions. Therefore, an ideal system of morality should take recognition of this impulse and furnish religious teaching about God to meet the needs of the child in the development of his religious and ethical life.

Secondly, we notice that the development of the idea of obedience passes through three stages in each individual and in the race. Moral education should aim at leading the child to the last stage of the development quickly, for joyous obedience to moral law is obtained in the last stage and this is done through perfect knowledge of the ground of the moral law. Hence moral education should lead the child to know the Author of the moral law.

Thirdly, moral education should utilize the child's innate tendency of imitation to build up

a noble character by imitating the example of a spotless and inspiring personage. But moral education fails to present to the child a perfect model. On the other hand, Christian education presents to children a most perfect and inspiring Personage to be their model. This great Personage is embodied in Jesus Christ, who is the incarnated God. He is imitable because he is human; he is inspiring because he is divine. Thus an ideal system of education cannot be separated from religious education.

Fourthly, moral education should aim at the development of noble and dynamic character, but this moral education fails to do. On the other hand, religious education has proven to be a dynamic factor in the building of noble and efficient character. Religious education accomplishes this because it deals with all of the fundamental feelings of man, which are the driving forces of conduct. These feelings are powerful because it is through them that man's unused energies are released. ~~There~~ Thus we again come to the conclusion that an ideal system of moral education cannot be separated from religious education.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION

The relation between religious and moral education is much bebated. Is there any connection between religious education and moral education? If so, Is this connection intrinsic and necessary, or is it accidental? Is religious education essential to the development of morality and sound character, or can moral training be given apart from religious education without detriment? Some who could never see any distinction between the two systems of education but their intimate relationship have never troubled and will never trouble themselves with this problem; but others see the real need, in this day and age, to define clearly their relation and distinction in order to bring home to many people the significance and validity of religious education. To the latter, the question of their relationship becomes one of supreme importance.

In some quarters to-day, it is maintained that

the time has come for a complete dissociation of the ethical life, ethical education and ideals, from every form of religious belief, and religious motives. This view is, that morality is indispensable to man's development, to his social life, to the advancement of the race; but religion is not a necessary element in man's spiritual development. It represents rather a stage of his development, which he will leave behind him, an adjunt which may have been serviceable to him in the past, but which is no longer a help to his progress, but for the most part a hindrance.[1] The "thoroughbred moralists", who hold this view even propose a complete dispensation of religious education, basing on the ground, that (1) right conduct is primarily a matter of habits,[2] (2) a social and educational question,[3] and (3) religious education slights moral education.[4]

To these accusations, there are counter-charges, loudly voiced from the staunch adherents of Catholicism, who call themselves the "Orthodox Christians."

1 Cf. G. S. Hall: Educational Problems, p. 204.
2 Spiller, Moral Education in Eighteen Countries, p. 51.
3 Ibid.,p. 10.
4 Ibid., p. 16.

They claim that morality is a peculiarly Christian product, and that the Pope and the Church are expressly infallible in matters of faith and morals. Their chief objections against the ethical culture movement are (1) that morality cannot be taught independently of theology, (2) that virtue which is a matter of the emotions, of the will, of habit, and of action cannot be taught, because instruction cannot go beyond imparting information, and (3) that given a good will, nothing more is required, for conscience, alone, can tell us what is right.

There are many sane Christian educators to-day, who hurry to the defense of their religion against modern materialism, advocate, in similar manner, with their Catholic brothers, the vital need of religious education in modern life; but, further-more, they see the need of having a new vision of religious education. The old method of instruction, they have agreed, must be changed; and children should be brought face to face with the essentials of religion. Not the letter, but the life of religion, should be imparted to them; for religion is more than rituals, vastly more than creeds and dogmas. Thus "in America the Religious Education Association was founded

to inspire the educational forces of this country with the religious ideal. Its representatives believes that education must be more spiritual and religion more intelligent to resist the commercializing, not to say the vulgarizing, influences of American life."[1] It is encouraging to know that much has already been done by this Association to define distinctly the relation between religious education and moral education.

In studying the relation between them, it is quite necessary to subject it to careful and critical examination; and before doing so, it behooves us to have the correct method of investigation, otherwise the result will certainly lead to failure.

Three methods have generally been employed to study this problem; namely, (1) the Historical method, (2) the Evolutional method, and (3) inquiry of the basic principles of religious and moral education.

(1) The Historical method. This method is to study religion and religions, as they are recorded in history and literature, or as we find them in some living savage tribes;and to study morality in similar

1 Hall: Educational Problems, p. 209.

manner. The object of this method is to discover which was in advance of the other, and to determine whether they were interdependent, or one was the product of the other. According to the result of some investigation, it is claimed that the connection between the two elements has at certain stages in the development of society been a loose one, and that their mutual influence has sometimes been practically negligible.[1] Haeckel reported that some tribes were destitute of religion,[2] but according to later investigation by the most authentic anthropologists, his view was not confirmed. It is generally admitted that at no period have tribes been discovered wholly devoid of religious beliefs, but many deny that morality was co-existent with religion. Miss Calkins says, "It is pointed out that primitive religions are full of positive immoral customs and rites, that the Borneans, for example, gain new spirits by head-hunting, and that the Oceanians have a god of thieving, to whom they offer a bit of their booty bribing him to secrecy with such

1 Cf. Fowler and Wilson, The Principles of Morals, p. 344; Tylor, Primitive Culture, p.368; Brinton, Religions of Primitive Peoples.
2 Haeckel, The Riddle of the Universe, p. 192.

words as these, 'Here is a bit of the pig; take it, good Hiero, and say nothing of it.' Such an argument, however, is inadequate, no matter how firmly established the facts on which it is based. For though Borneans and Oceanians and all other savage people perform acts, which we call wrong, as parts of their religious observance, it may be that they do not thereby violate their own moral codes."[1]

Höffding tells us that the lowest forms of religion cannot be said to have any ethical significance; because the gods appear as powers on which man is dependent, but not as patterns of conduct or administrators of an ethical world-order. He says morality grows out of the struggle for life, the family strife, and the clan strife. But he, however, without self-consistency, admits that nature-religions have their ethics, for they make definite claims on man, who must show respect and obedience to the divine powers demanding ceremonies and sacrifice in their honour.[2] This latter view of Höffding, Galloway confirms and upholds by declaring that the natural respect, of the primitive man, for what is

1 Miss Calkins: First Book in Psychology, p. 267.
2 Hoeffding, Philosophy of Religion, pp.323-325.

habitual is fortified by the fear of an uncanny power avenging the transgression of the custom; and the careful observance of the custom, which necessitates self-control, has implicitly an ethical meaning. The historical method, we see, though casting some light on the problem concerning the relation between religion and morality, does not show the essential and intrinsic relation of religious and moral education.

(2) The Evolutional method. The doctrine of evolution has given us a new mental framework on which to construct our view of life and the world. It has been applied in the sphere of science and art and is now also extended to the realm of religion and morality. What used to be considered as recondite and abstruse is now placed under the dissecting knife of evolution, hoping to reduce it to simpler form or original elements, so that our mind can grasp its full meaning and the intrinsic value therein. Many scholars have applied this method in their study of the relation between religion and morality.[1] We see that though they have been

1 Some of the representative works are "Natural Religion," by Max Muller; "The Origin and Development of the Morals Ideas," by L. T. Hobhouse; and "Morals in Evolution," by E. Westermarck.

able to show and give evidences of their strata through which religion and morality have emerged from the crude stage to the present one, yet it is hardly germane to our problem to refer to the evolutionary phase of religion and morality; for the evolutional method is applicable only in the field of science where facts and descriptions are considered. On the other hand, in religion and morality, the judgments which form their content are not only judgments of fact but judgments of value. Here we have to do with questions of what ought to be, and not merely with what is. Thus we may hold that the evolutional method is inapplicable to the study of the relation between religious and moral education, because it does not show the true nature and the intrinsic value of religion and morality. It is in the search for their true nature we find the real bond of union between them.

(3) Inquiry of the basic principles of religious and moral education.

We come, then, to the third method, which is to inquire the basic principles of religion and morality. This method alone can reveal to us their true nature,

their intrinsic value and the real bond of union between them. It differs from the historical method, because it does not regard the information we receive from history concerning the mutual influence of religion and morality on each other as anything of special importance. Likewise, it differs from the evolutional method in that it does not give us the impression, as does the latter, that the origin of religion is to be ascribed to superstitious fear and the origin of morality is to be found in primitive social customs.

We shall follow this last method in our investigation of the relationship of religious and moral education. We shall first discuss and define the nature of their relationship; then we shall prove that there is a significant relation between religious and moral education, because both religious and moral ideals are realized in God; and finally we shall show that, for many cogent reasons, an ideal system of moral education is inseparable from religious education.

CHAPTER II.

NATURE OF RELATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION

In our investigation of the relationship of religious and moral education, we shall begin by defining and discussing the nature of their relation, before attempting to show that they are vitally related. We find there are, at least, three fundamental phases of the nature of their relation. These are, namely, (1) religious education and moral education are characterized by the objects with which they deal; (2) religious education and moral education are characterized by the extent of their social outlook; and (3) religious education and moral education are characterized by the value they give to personality.

(1) We shall begin with the first phase of the nature of relation between religious and moral education. This is that religious education and moral education are characterized by the objects with which they deal. The object of religious education is God; the object of moral education is the world. Our study of these two objects, God and the world, will give us a key to the understanding of the nature of relation between religious and moral

education.

Religious education inculcates a body of truths or beliefs respecting God and our relation to Him; and flowing from these a collection of duties which have God for their primary object. These truths are that God is the ground of the natural law in the universe and moral law in human life and affairs, and that we all inherit something of the powers of mind, will and spirit of God. God conceived as the ground of the natural law means there is order instead of chaos, there is cosmic intelligence instead of the reign of chance, and there is progress instead of a recurring cycle of change. The thought of God as the ground of natural law has been the chief object of thought since the early Greek philosophers and the early wise men of all nations. It has vitalized morality and is the best safeguard against pessimism and despair. In this respect, religious education which is primarily concerned with God is vitally related to morality.

Besides natural law, the thought of God means moral law. In our religion, the most perfect of all great religions, God is the judge of human conduct, loving righteousness and hating iniquity. Hence the ascription of the Mosaic Decalogue to the

very finger of Jehovah, and hence Hosea's enunciation of the great ethical truth, that what God desires is not sacrifice, but mercy.[1] This identification of God and the ethical truth has sprung from the very beginning of the spiritual life of man, and has grown with his growth of the intellectual advance. It has kept pace with the upward movements of races and civilization. It has inspired many great makers of history. Lincoln spoke, under the shadow of the approaching conflict, "I know there is a God, and that he hates injustice and slavery..."[2] Thus,again, religious education which is primarily concerned with God is vitally related to morality.

Religious education is chiefly concerned with God, because it teaches that we all inherit something of the powers of mind, will and spirit of God. If we want to perfect our moral nature, think of God, revere God, love God, and surrender ourselves to Him. Here we see that religious education which is primarily concerned with God is vitally related to morality, because it recognizes the divine nature

1 Hosea, chap. 6:6.
2 Quoted by Sisson in his The Essentials of Character, p. 170.

of man, which has the potentiality of ethical attainments.

We now turn to the object of moral education and see whether it has any relation with religious education. The object is the world, because moral education is concerned with the existing condition of things, with the surroundings of the individual, with the sphere within which he has his place, in its various aspects. We have many relations in the world. It is due to these relations that we lie under obligation. It is within the scope of moral education to define these relations in order that we may maintain right relations with the persons and things in the world. Since each person is obligated to his country for his proctection and safety, moral education teaches that he should be loyal to his country. Since he is benefited by the community, or society, of which he is a member, he is taught to do his part to serve others who need his help. Since he owes much to his relatives and friends, he is taught to love and serve them. Since he is much indebted to all men of the past for the great bequest of which he is one of the heirs, he is taught to

leave his impress on history and hand down his legacy to the future. All these duties taught in moral education are inculcated in religious education. The difference between the former and the latter is that in moral education all these duties are taught apart from religious experience, which is the conception of God in history, in literature, and in all things of the world. The omission of God in moral education, such as advocated by the "thorough-bred" moralists, is, undoubtedly the greatest defect of such kind of moral education; whereas, in reality, there is vital relation between religious and moral education, because religious education is simply the consummation of moral education.

The nature of relation between religious and moral education can be made clear when the relation in which God stands to the world is clearly understood. The Jewish God is a transcendental one. He is conceived as if he is above and apart from the world. The God of Spinoza is in the world and is identical with it. Between these two extremes, it seems the true view is that God is neither above the world, in the sense of being apart and distinct from it, nor is He in the world, in the sense of

being one with it. He is above it as its cause, source, and creator. It is a mainfestation of Him, but He is greater than His manifestation. On the other hand, He is in it, as its sustaining energy and its governing principle. It displays, in its various movements and operations, an order and harmony that testify to a permanent force and intelligence working in every part and at every stage with unity of design. God's relation to the world understood as such, it is possible for one to see the world moving toward ultimate realization, because God is above the world and leading it; and, on the other hand, it is possible to have religious experience, that is, to have communionship with God, because God manifests Himself in the world.[1] Therefore

1 Professor Horne has a very illuminating passage, in which he tries to show that our understanding of the world hinges on our knowledge of God. He says, "A great new light is thus thrown upon the final nature of the environment of men, hitherto described as intellectual, emotional, and volitional, in adjustment to which consists the education of man. The environment of man is God. Science, reached by the intellect of man, is the thought of God in the world; art, reached by the emotions of man, is the feeling of God in the world; and volition, as expressed through the will of man, is the plan of God in the world." (Philosophy of Education, p. 271.)

religious education is the consummation of moral education, because it teaches one to know God by studying the world about one, but it also teaches one to interpret the world in the light of one's spiritual experience which is the conception of God.

(2) We come to the second phase of the nature of relation between religious and moral education, which is that they are characterized by the extent of their social outlook.

Educational theories have undergone many changes and modifications. Just now the theory in vogue seems to be the social theory of education.[1] This theory regards society as the prime educator. Teachers, parents and others merely act as agents for society, because they are themselves under the control of their group in respect both to what they teach and to the fact thay they teach anything at all. This theory declares that action directed to social ends--the goods of human persons, however that good is consceived--is moral; and action directed to anti-social, or even unsocial ends is immoral. Accepting this theory of education, we find that religious and moral education are related, because they both aim to

1 Coe, G. A., A Social Theory of Religious Education. Dewey, John, The School and Society.

train the individual for occupying his proper place in the social whole. The individual is taught, in either case, to acknowledge his duties and obligations and to assume right relations to his environment, or the social whole, of which he is a part. On the other hand, there is a great difference between the social outlook that religious education deals with and the social outlook that moral education deals with. The former is larger than the latter, because religious education recognizes a society that comprises God ~~, nature~~ and man, while moral education is only concerned with the society of man.

This difference in extent between the social outlook of religious education and that of moral education does not alter the fundamental relation between religious and moral education. For it seems that ultimately moral education will have to deal with a society that also includes God. ~~and nature.~~ This reason is apparent, if we review the history concerning the progress of man's social ideals and the ever-enlarging of his social outlook. The primitive men could not conceive of a society larger than their immediate circle, the family, or

the clan. Only within this narrow circle there was a vivid interchange of thought and feeling, a sphere of moral unity, of sympathy, loyalty, honor and congenial intercourse. As ~~the~~ time gnawed its way, and as man grew in experience, there was gradual enlargement of social outlook. The mind constantly, though perhaps not regularly, extended the sphere within which it made its higher powers valid. Human natrue, possessed of the social impulse, was ever striving with difficulties of communication and organization which obstruct their realization on a larger scale. On and on, however, constantly prompted by this impulse, men formed tribes, then states and then nations. They adopted higher standards and ideals by sacrificing their own narrow ones. This process is still continuing, and there is no reason that there will not be a time when the ideals of the brotherhood of man and the Fatherhood of God will be accepted by all peoples. We are told that moral education aims at the realization of the ideal of the brotherhood of man. But this ideal can be realized only when all peoples acknowledge the Fatherhood of God. Thus we see religious education is vitally related to moral edu-

cation, because one part of religious education is simply the consummation of social outlook.

(3) We come to the third place of the nature of relation between religious and moral education. This is that religious education and moral education are characterized by the value they give to personality. It is an evident fact that high esteem of an individual's personality has a direct and important bearing on his conduct; but this fact seems to be ignored in moral education, such as advocated by the moralists who exclude religious teaching from it. Such moral education cannot ascribe high value to personality, because it does not deal with things beyond their temporal and material relations and surroundings. Hence the formation of right conduct is merely a matter of habit formation, a purely biological process. Religious education, on the other hand, ascribes high value to personality; it recognizes the spiritual side of man's life. It teaches, as Professor George Albert Coe has said, that the truly human life is not made up of the possession of things, or the possession of power, or the enjoyment of sensuous pleasures, but of the free and

social exercise of the higher or spiritual capacities, namely, his capacities for truth, the appreciation of beauty, and the exercise of unselfish love.[1] Moreover religious education not only ascribes high spiritual value to personality, but also recognizes it as capable of surviving death. The ascription of immortality to human life is certainly very essential in the formation of personal ideals and the building of strong character. It guarantees to man ~~of his~~ an opportunity for the free exercise of his capacity for infinite growth; it gives him true enthusiasm and inspiration to press forward 'toward the mark,' which is boundless perfectibility of his character. Thus religious education in giving high value to personality is vitally related to morality.

The divergence of moral education from religious education in its recognition of personal value is not beyond remedy, because such moral education as is advocated by the moralists is very incomplete. When it assumes the substantial form and content of religious education, it reaches its perfection.

1 Coe, Distinction Between Morals and Religion, in The Journal of the Religious Education Association, 2: 5, Dec. 1907.

Summarizing all the preceding discussions concerning the nature of relation between religious and moral education, we reach the following ~~last~~ conception: Religious education is related to moral education, because the world is a manifestation of God; because the Kingdom of God is the ultimate realization of our social vision; because religious education by inspiring one to cherish a high personal ideal is the consummation of moral education.

CHAPTER III.

MORAL IDEAL REALIZED IN GOD

We have defined the nature of the relation between religious and moral education in the last chapter; and we shall try, in this chapter, to show the fundamental relation of religious and moral education. This fundamental relation is shown in the fact that the ultimate realization of the moral ideal is to be found in God. But we are told that some of the so-called "thoroughbred" moralists even do not believe that man's moral nature is an indication of his divine origin, far less will they accept a theory of the moral ideal and the truth that the moral ideal is realized in God. For this reason, before we discuss the realization of the moral ideal in God, we shall point out the absurdity of some of the moralists' explanation of man's moral nature; and show the necessity of having a theory of the moral ideal.

Many of the moralists believe that morals can be taught apart from philosophical or theological

sanctions and the conception of God,[1] because their conception of man's moral nature differs fundamentally from that of the Christian educators. They base their view on some absurd theories, such as "social evolution," "self-interest," and similar ones, to account for the existence of man's moral nature. These theories certainly do not tend to show any connection between morality and our religious conception. Hence their contention of the uselessness of introducing religious teaching into moral education. We shall now point out the falsity of their view.

I. Social Evolution Examined.

We shall first give a brief summary of the social-evolution theory from Mr. Fiske's "Outlines

1 Most of the moralists believe that morals are like some transferable commodities, which do not grow out of the inner life of man, but can be mechanically delivered to the pupils by their teachers. Thus Mr. Felix Adler, the leader of the school of the Society of Ethical Culture of New York City, says, "It is the business of the moral instructor in the public school to deliver to his pupils the subject matter of morality, but not to deal with the sanctions of it; to give to his pupils a clear understanding of what is right and what is wrong, but not to enter into the question why the right should be done and the wrong avoided..." (Rugh, Moral Training in the Public Schools, pp. 8, 9.)

of Cosmic Philosophy."[1] He probably expresses this theory more clearly and fully than most of the other social evolutionists, though he does not originate this theory. Mr. Fiske says that men were only gregarious at the beginning, but they gradually became social. The transition from gregariousness to sociality was effected by the formation of permanent family relations. Out of the permanent family, society arose. From the permanence of family relationship, filial and fraternal ties were first developed. Then, as the family expanded, tribal ties were formed. Later the tribes, by growth, or by alliance with other tribes, became a nation, and national ties were created. Thus by a natural movement, a varied and complex condition of things came into existence, with many relations to be recognised and honoured by those who were embraced within it.

Such is the genesis of sociality and society, and, corresponding with their genesis, was the genesis of the moral sense. The latter is a necessary result of the former. When men were only gregarious, they were egoistic and self-regarding. At this stage, the incentives to action were those of pain

1 Vol. ii, chap. xxii.

and pleasure. Afterwards, when permanent family or tribal relations were established, men entered their second stage of their moral evolution. The feelings that pertain to this stage are happily characterized by Mr. Spencer as "ego-altruistic." Ego-altruistic feelings "concern the happiness of the individual in so far as it depends upon the feelings with which his fellow-creatures regard him." Generosity, for instance, is to a very large extent ego-altruistic. It is altruistic as exercised to benefit another, "the recipient's feeling toward the giver and the approval of spectators" is more vividly represented than "the pleasure given."[1]

The last stage in the development of the moral sense is reached when the feelings of action are purely altruistic. The incentives which influence man's action are what we call moral sentiments of right and wrong, which do not refer either to personal benefits or evils to be expected from men, or to more remote rewards and punishments. The accomplishment of the development of the moral

1 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, vol. ii, p.352.

sense to this stage is due to the enormous expansion of sympathy and the formation of public opinion. The term sympathy means "the power of ideally reproducing in one's self the pleasures and pains of another person,"[1] and is a kind of self-pleasing, because what it impels us to do, is to remove what is painful for us to see. This sympathy does not at first affect conduct to strangers and lower animals; it affects only conduct within the limits of the clan, and it affects it there because "a curb" is put upon the exercise of brute-like predatory instincts by "a nascent public opinion, which lauds actions beneficial to the clan and frowns upon actions detrimental to it." Public opinion is the product of "a sense of collective pleasure or pain."[2]

The enormous expansion of sympathy is due to the continued integration of communities. When this is being carried on, sympathy gradually ceases to be the power of reproducing in one's self the pain of another, and becomes the power of "representing feelings detached from the incidents of

1 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, vol. ii, p. 346.
2 Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 347, 348.

particular cases." From this latter power there comes the "instinctive abhorrence of actions which the organically registered experience of mankind has associated with pain or evil," a power that, as "the sympathetic feelings are extended over wider areas," becomes stronger and stronger, until at last it generates "an abstract moral sense, so free from the element of personality that to grosser minds it is unintelligible."[1]

Such as has been briefly stated is Mr. Fiske's theory of the "genesis of man, morally." Clearly, this theory is very faulty. Firstly, it is evident that "Ex nihilo nihil fit" is a principle denied by Mr. Fiske. He says that the change from gregariousness to sociality is the change from hedonism to morality, and the difference between gregariousness and sociality is merely a difference in the duration of relations. We note this is merely a change of form, while the transformation from brute nature to morality implies a qualitative change. He ought to know that men are social when brought together into certain unions, because they are social

1 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, vol.ii, pp. 355.356.

by nature; and they form these unions because of their inherent tendency to do so.

Secondly, Mr. Fiske says that the gradual transition from the purely egoistic to the purely altruistic standpoint is due to development and expansion. Beginning with the purely egoistic, we pass through the ego-altruistic to the purely altruistic. But this transition seems to be, not development, but substitution, not the steady rising of one thing out of another, but the violent displacement of one thing by another. It is natural that what is essentially selfish in its origin and nature will always be selfish throughout its history and selfish in its last state. The employment of the "ego-altruistic" stage as a connecting link does not in any way remove the difficulty. Mr. Fiske regards this stage as the transitional one between the purely egoistic and the purely altruistic stage. The "ego-altruistic" stage is the result of the influence of public opinion on sympathy. "The ego-altruistic feelings concern the happiness of the individual in so far as it depends upon the feelings with which his

fellow-creatures regard him."[1] It is clear that, according to his own statement, we find no difference between this stage and the previous one; for it is still the egoistic spirit which predominates over one's feelings.

Thirdly, Mr. Fiske says that the transformation of sympathy from selfish to social standpoint is due to the influence of public opinion. This view is untenable, because he is self-contradictory according to his own definitions of sympathy and public opinion. If public opinion is a collective sympathy, it cannot exist, that is it is not public opinion. The pleasures and pains of some people against whom the public opinion is directed will be reproduced in their neighbours; and this reproduction of pains and pleasure in others will immediately arouse sympathy, which renders public opinion invalid. Again sympathy as is defined by him does not need the influence of public opinion to transform it from selfish to social standpoint; for the reproduction of others' pains and pleasures in oneself necessarily leads to one's adjustment of one's conduct toward others; and a "curb" from public

1 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, vol.ii, p.352.

opinion will be unnecessary.

Fourthly, the so-called "enormous expansion of sympathy" due to the continued integration of communities is very questionable. By the expression, "enormous expansion," he means that "when the pain occasioned by the sight of another's suffering, or by the idea of suffering and wrong when generalized and detached from the incidents of particular cases, becomes so strong as to determine our actions, then the chasm is entirely crossed which divides us psychically from the brutes."[1] It is this expansion of sympathy that generates "at last an abstract moral sense, so free from the element of personality that to grosser minds it is unintelligible."[2] Mr. Fiske here does not notice that expansion of an idea does not alter its essential significance. All that it can do is to widen the range of its application. We may generalize and detach from the incidents of particular cases the idea of suffering and wrong which these particular cases have suggested to us. Such generalisation and detachment cannot in any way affect

1 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, vol.ii, p.353.
2 Ibid., pp. 355,356.

the intrinsic value of the idea generalized and detached. The only difference between the pain occasioned by the sight of another's suffering and the generalized and detached idea of that suffering is that, in the one case, we are moved by a painful sight, and, in the other case, by a painful imagination. So far as their aim is concerned, they are one and the same. They are distinctly personal in their bearing, and it is impossible to extract from either of them a moral sense that is free from the element of personality.

II. The Divine Origin of Man's Moral Nature.

From the brief survey of the social-evolution theory, we are naturally led to the inevitable conclusion that man's moral nature is something absolutely "sui generis." The moral consciousness of right and wrong, speaking with a mandatory tone, in the imperative mood, certainly cannot have its origin in selfishness, or self-love. There are certain vital springs of action, such as altruistic love, parental affection and others, "whose characteristic it is to be disinterested, that is, to impel us forward upon an action or an object suited to that part of our nature, without preconception of the experience it

will bring."[1] "The object is not wanted because it gives pleasure; it gives pleasure because it is wanted."[2] The springs of action are certainly inherent in the very nature of man as man, and they could not have been acquired through social experience. Indeed, if there is anything in the world that is akin to Divine Nature, it is man's moral nature; for in the world there is nothing more noble than man, and in man there is nothing more noble than his moral nature. Divine Nature is moral in its very core.

Our conception of the true character of man's moral nature has an important bearing on our problem, the relationship of religious and moral education. Clearer light on this problem can only be obtained by further reflecting on the nature of morality and the ends it implies. The result of the discussion will perhaps make it very plain how the religious and the ethical ideals are to be related to one another; hence the vital relation of moral and religious education.

1 Martineau, A Study of Religion, p. 11.
2 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

III. Moral Ideal 'versus' Moral Law.

In the main ethical theory has run on two lines, which may be characterized as the Formal and the Teleological.[1] In the one case the meaning of moral action is interpreted by the relation of the will to a law which claims obedience. The other method involves an attempt to interpret ethical action through the end to which it is directed. This latter view has found more expression in the writings of many ethical writers[2] of to-day than does the former.

The development of an ethical theory from the formal standpoint of view finds its clearest expression in the Kantian philosophy. Kant declares that the only thing which is absolutely, unconditionally good, in this world or any other, is the good will. This will is good in and of itself, and not because of anything which it produces, or any consequences which flow from it. In answer to the question, what makes the will good, the Kantian answer is, the conformity of this will to moral law, or the cate-

1 This classification is used by Professor Galloway in his The Principles of Religious Development.
2. McCunn, in his The Making of Character, and Galloway, in his work just quoted, espouse the eth-theory from teleological standpoint, with very illuminating arguments.

gorical imperative of duty. Examining Kant's view closely, we shall find that it is confronted with serious difficulty, because the moral law is without content. The categorical imperative does not tell us what it is our duty to do. Kant seeks to avoid this difficulty by means of what may be called the maxim of duty, which is, Act only from that maxim which you can will to be law universal. This maxim is based upon his assumption of the universality of moral law. But this maxim, we find, is not susceptible of universal application; for there are many cases showing that it may be right for some one to do certain things in certain situations, but it may not be right for every man to do the same thing in the same situation. The most serious difficulty that his theory encounters is its assumption, "that something is right, because it is commanded, instead of being commanded because it is right."[1] Basing on this assumption, the ground of our moral distinctions becomes purely arbitrary; and a rational ground of obligation is impossible.

1 Russell, First Course in Philosophy, p.261.

The inadequacy of the formalistic method as shown in the Kantian doctrine of the good will, or categorical imperative of the supremacy of duty, is clear enough. It seems that, if we are to have a sound ethical theory, our choice must lie on the other one, the teleological view of ethics. This view is found in those conceptions of the supreme End of life which philosophy has been giving to the world since the days of Socrates. Although they are as different from one another as the philosophies that have produced them--Duty, Perfection, Greatest Happiness, Greatest Blessedness, Self-realisation, and the rest--yet they all are alike in that they work for unity. McCunn says that they work for unity because they involve the belief that all the duties of life are but so many diverse modes of approach to a single, all-pervading End.[1] Moreover a theory of an ethical end ~~it~~ prepares a way for those who are caught between the 'Scylla and Charybdis' of duties due to the changing conditions of time and place and the necessity of giving the place of prior obligation now to this duty and now to that. "He who

1 McCunn, The Making of Character, p. 230.

looks for ever to a Code is only too apt to claim for every commandment in it an equal, or in other words an impossible, absolute authority. He who looks to a Type, even when he goes behind the letter to the spirit, is prone to exaggerate what is local and limited. But he who grasps the idea of an End has risen to what is universal, and will be careful to promote no duty to the place of absolute authority, except the one supreme duty of pursuing the End in the highest practicable mode."[1]

A conception of an ethical end is not merely the result of philosophical speculation. It arises in our desire to respond to unity and coherence of moral acts; it grows out of the very nature of our action which is purposive throughout. Moreover, the ethical end is the object of love and desire; hence it is man's moral ideal toward which man strives and aspires to reach.

Without a conception of ~~the~~ moral ideal, man cannot be called a rational being. When we see a man who rests his activities on the plane of mere instinct or impulse, where considerations play no part, he is immoral and no longer deserves to be

1 McCunn, The Making of Character, p. 230.

called a rational being. "In punishment," Hegel says, "the offender is honoured as a rational being," that is, as a being capable of seeing and choosing a better way. Again, without a conception of the moral ideal, moral freedom remains imperfect. When we meet the men who never examine and understand the grounds upon which service is rendered, they are, indeed, the "bondsmen" of Duty. Only a conception of the moral ideal can help us to be able to stick to our allegiance to our habitual duties, by making it open-eyed, intelligent, reasonable.

IV. The Ultimate Realization of The Moral Ideal.

What then is the moral ideal? We have noticed that there have been different conceptions of the moral ideal since the days of Socrates. Each particular mode or form of moral ideal slowly yielded to the other, because it could not stand the test of time. Just now the socialistic movement has taken the place of the individualistic movement, which reached its zenith in the eighteenth century. It is likely that the conception of the moral ideal of many people of to-day is in the direction of the social good. Their opinion probably is based on the assumption that inasmuch as man is essentially a

social being, whose well-being and happiness depends on others, the moral ideal should be determined as social. But we find that the social standard of value changes. Something that is regarded as the social good by one group of people is not so regarded by another group; the social good of yesterday was not the same as it is today, nor will it remain the same to-morrow. Professor Adler says, "Moral basis must be changed from time to time because society is changing around us, the conditions under which life is carried on are changing; the altered conditions raise up new moral problems and in the attempt to solve them, our knowledge of the nature and of the significance of morality itself must be enlarged."[1]

Not only are there different conceptions of the moral ideal, but we also find that the moral ideal finds no "earthly close." It lies in the region far beyond our present experience. So Mr. Galloway describes it in his illuminating words, saying, "Man advances by painful stages, and the goal in all its fulness is not before his eyes. His growth in ethical

1 Adler, The Scope and Aim of Ethical Education. In International Moral Education Congress papers, 1908, pp. 7-14.

experience gives richer content to the ideal, but it likewise discloses the ideal in a region beyond the present, on the limit far withdrawn. The goal moves with the traveller: at no point in the journey does he enter the land of promise, he only beholds it afar off."[1]

At this point we may say that our inability to state the moral ideal in an absolute and finally satisfying form is certainly due to the fact the realization of the moral ideal under temporal and mundane conditions is impossible. It seems that the completion of Morality is to be found in Religion; for morality itself is neither final nor absolute. If the moral ideal is to rest on an absolute and unconditional basis, so that it can be binding on us, its ultimate realization must be found in God.

A little reflection on our moral nature will show that all ideals point to God as their final goal. There are at least three fundamental elements of our moral nature. Firstly, we are aware of

1 Galloway, The Principles of Religious Development, p. 247.

our world, and our impulse of development is bound up with understanding, appreciating and being in harmony with it. As we understand it better and appreciate it more, we learn the better to accommodate ourselves to it and it to us. We learn also ~~learn~~ to reverence its vastness and variety and to sympathies with those elements in it of like nature with us. So we have the Social Ideal. Secondly, we have the impulse of the individual self-consciousness towards harmony and balance within ourselves, and so we have the Personal Ideal. Thirdly, we are conscious of God, the Meaning and Being of all things; and so we have the Religious Ideal, which is the harmony and completion of our existing selves through communion with God. Thus it is implied in our nature that we should seek to be ~~at~~ at one with our individual selves, at one with our fellows and have them at one with each of us, and at one with God, our Final Goal and our Ultimate Ideal.

God is the one ultimate Ideal, but there are at least three ways of laying hold on it. We may consider the dignity and value of our souls,

paying attention at the outset to the development of the individual nature as the end. There are many people who turn their mind to the ideal of personal perfection, because it is so attractive. What these men need is faith in the eternal value of their souls. They should free themselves from all distracting elements which may spoil the purity of their character; and their motto should be, "Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." Or we may turn the mind to social duties, sympathy with our fellows, public spirit, the ideal of service--morality in the specific sense. There are undoubtedly many people who find the social ideal very attractive. For these men it is very important that their will should be in harmony with the Purpose that directs the world. This means they should have faith in an end, or purpose, toward which all being tends and with which man can cooperate and is called upon to do so. The negative of this faith is expressed in pessimsm and indifference to life, such as the scientific pessimism of Schopenhauer and the atomism of Democritus, the worst curse that has ever fallen on man. In contradiction

to this last, we may take hold of the religious ideal and follow the lead of the Hebrew prophets, who communed with God and received from Him the knowledge of His righteous everlasting purpose, a purpose that includes the achievement of righteous for man through man.

V. The Intimate Relationship of Morality and Religious Education.

In view of all the above discussions on man's moral nature, his moral ideal, and its realization in God, we may dispel the view of those moralists, who wish to exclude religious teaching from moral education. We find that religious teaching does help to quicken man's moral life, because the latter shows its kinship with the Divine Nature. Moreover, all ideals are intimately related, because they all find their realization in God, the object of religious education.

Morality is, indeed, intimately related to religious education. From the standpoint of religious education, all duties are duties toward God. The fulfilment of duty toward God is a fulfilment of all other duties. So Dr. Wuttke, says

that, in every duty toward God, we fulfil also directly at the same time a duty toward ourselves. We cannot possible love and honor God without exalting ourselves into communion with Him. Whatever man does to the honor of God is at the same time a self-transfiguration. He cannot praise God as his Father without confirming himself as the child of God. Moreover he can do this only in so far as he, at the same time, denies himself of illegitimate self-love and loves all of his fellow-men, who are also the children of God.[1]

Inasmuch as religious education is vital and important in the development and growth of man's moral life, the apparent contradiction between religious education and such moral education as to advocated by the moralists is due to the incompleteness of such system of moral education. It is certain that, when an ideal system of moral education is adopted, there will be no difference between religious and moral education. We are ready to show, in the next chapter, the necessary elements of religious teaching that an ideal system of moral education should include.

Wuttke, Christian Ethics, tr. by Lacroix. vol. ii, p. 148.

CHAPTER IV.

AN IDEAL SYSTEM OF MORAL EDUCATION INSEPARABLE FROM RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

In the last chapter, we have reached the conclusion that morality is intimately related to religious education, because the realization of the moral ideal is found in God. We are now ready to show in this chapter that an ideal system of moral education is inseparable from religious education, because it should include in it the essential elements of religious truth.

We are told that Froebel is the father of modern education, because it is he, whose motto,"Come, let us live with our child," has inaugurated a new epoch of education. Hitherto educators approached the child from the adult point of view: adult interests, ways of looking at things, rules of conduct, were assumed as a standard for all. Modern education, on the other hand, makes the child the center of interest and study. The needs of the child are observed and studied; the laws of the child-mind yields laws for educating that mind. For this reason, it may be said that an ideal system

of moral education should recognize the needs of the child and provide an adequate program of instruction, taking into consideration all religious truths and other factors that enter into the growth and development of the child's ethical life.

I. The Religious Impulse and Its Significance.

Since moral education is an effort to develop the moral nature of the child, to bring his germinal powers to maturity, the most important and undeniable fact that it has to reckon with is that man has a religious impulse and this impulse is intimately bound up with his moral life. Not very long ago men were still asking whether religion might not have arisen through priestcraft or statecraft, or at least through some incidental feature of human experience, but the rapid development of the science of religion in recent years has revealed an important truth that man as such has a religious impulse out of which have sprung all the religions of the world.[1]

We may ask what is the true meaning of this impulse. Perhaps the best answer that can be given

1 See, for example, Morris Jastrow: The Study of Religion, pp. 195f., 293f.

is that the religious impulse comes from God, who works within man and upon ~~him~~ man through his environment of persons and things. This statement is confirmed by the universal experience of mankind. All of us feel more or less our own limitations and dependence upon visible things. Both the idea and feeling of dependence tend to push backward, beyond all things that are themselves dependent, to their ultimate ground. ~~More~~ Moreover we find ourselves and our world standing over against each other in an antithesis: our wants always outrun the ~~suply~~ supply that the world can give. Lastly, we have an innate tendency to conceive an ideal world and an ideal self, presiding over the so-called real world and the real self. This ideal world and this ideal self are taken by us as the truly real world and the truly real self primarily because of the strength of our felt wants.

This religious impulse is not only the adult's experience, but it appears even in the very early age of childhood. As the child's experience grows he becomes conscious of himself and other things and persons. Through his experiences, he makes

demands upon objects about him. Very soon a world, a self, and a demand become dimly explicit. Through memory, expectation, and disappointed hopes, he begins to construct an ideal world alongside the world of actual experience. For a long time the ideal is exceedingly crude, but it gradually becomes more and more refined.[1] At last when he attains adulthood, his religious impulse reaches its full development; and he will have either some religious convictions or a philosophy of life.

The significance of the religious impulse in its bearing on moral education cannot be ignored; for we find that our religious life and moral life merge into each other. The development and growth of the religious impulse ~~are~~ is interwoven with those of the ethical ideals. If we turn our mind to ~~the~~ children again, we will find that as soon as they begin to reflect, as they do at an early age, they want to know many things, such as the facts and laws of nature, the mystery of generation and birth, Bible history, human institutions and customs, moral laws, God, and many other mysteries of life. This insatiable desire for information, which we regard

1 Coe, George A., Education in Religion and Morals, pp. 204-205.

as an indication of the development of the religious impulse, arises out of their felt wants for guides of conduct. As soon as they know the meaning of the things and objects about them, their activities immediately become acts for ends; and consequently they have moral quality. The more they learn about the world of persons and things and their relation to them, the better will they be able to adjust themselves to them. Thus we may say that moral education cannot afford to ignore the importance of the religious impulse. Therefore an ideal system of moral education is inseparable from religious education, because it should include in its curriculum the teaching about God.

II. Joyous Obedience Obtained Through Knowledge of the Ground of the Moral Law.

Teaching religious truths about God not only meets the great needs of the religious and ethical life of the child, but also helps the child to obtain perfect moral freedom which is ~~is~~ joyous obedience to the moral law. Joyous obedience to the moral law certainly cannot be obtained unless the rational ground of the moral law is clearly understood.

If we review the development of the idea of obedience in the race and the individual, we will notice the significant relation of religious education to the full development of this great virtue.

We are told that there are three stages in the development of the idea of obedience in the race. In the first stage, the primitive people were compelled to obey their rulers thruogh fear of punishment. In the second stage, increase of numbers and expansion of the race removed the subjects from the presence of the rulers and made decress and gods necessary. Men acted according to their belief in these decrees. In the third stage, increasing intelligence is forcing modern civilization to base its authority upon insight and reason; and obedience to its authority is made through knowledge of its ground. Similarly the normal child passes through these racial stages. At first the child is weak and ignorant, and it is quite necessary that a stronger, wiser person exercises continuous personal oversight. The child is thus made habitually to obey the authority

of its superior through fear of punishment and desire for approbation. Belief, or faith, characterizes the second stage of obedience. When the child has acquired strength and control of muscles, and a system of memories and images, he may be left alone in familiar situations. Belief in his own powers and in the sanity and soundness of the lessons from former acts of obedience to authority serves as an omnipresent, unseen guide to reactions. Finally, as intelligence increases, the child begins to seek understanding of the rational ground of any authority or law to which he yields his obedience; and he discovers the absolute authority of ~~which is~~ the moral order of the universe, which forms the background of all authorities.[1] His soul freely and joyously answers back to this moral order of the universe, because he finds that it corresponds with the inner law of his ideal self.

The function of moral education should be to help the child to pass quickly through the early stages and to gain perfect freedom, which is joyous obedience to the moral law. But moral education cannot accomplish this result, if it excludes religious teaching about God, the Author of the

1 Cf. Rugh, Moral Training in the Public School, p. 15.

moral law. Religious education, on the other hand, leads the child to recognize an unchangeable absolute Will of God, which demands the obedience of all people. The child is led to realize that the wills of his parents and teachers demand his respect and obedience, because they are based on the same absolute Will. Thus we see that an ideal system of moral education is inseparable from religious education, because joyous obedience can be obtained only through perfect understanding of the ground of the moral law.

III. The Influence and Importance of Example in the Building of Character.

The truth that example is one of the most important educational forces is well recognized by all of the ethical and religious educators. We shall see that this recognition also leads to the inevitable conclusion of the inseparability of religious education and an ideal system of moral education.

We must begin by asking what is the most powerful native tendency of the child which has significant bearing on the formation of positive character. To us, the answer seems to indicate that

the child's innate tendency to imitate an example is perhaps the most important factor in the development of character. The influence and importance of example as an educational force is due to this innate tendency. Each child in very early age begins to imitate unconsciously the actions of those around him.[1] Naturally his first model is likely to be his mother, with whom he is best acquainted. She thus becomes an ideal and the argument that "mamma would not do it if she were you" begins to have strong force with him, so that he comes to pattern his life after hers. A little later he is likely to choose, quite unconsciously of course, a model outside of his family, always, however, one with whom he is brought into more or less close contact. This model may be a school teacher, a Sunday school teacher, a soldier, or, indeed, any other person that attracts his admiration. But each model in turn proves unsatisfactory as his intelligence grows, for unconsciously he finds flaws in them all. Then he begins to substitute an imaginary model for an actual one. Perhaps it is a historical character in regard to whom only

1 Conn, Social Heredity and Social Evolution, p. 105.

a few facts are known, so that ample room is left for his imagination to fill out the remainder and thus create out of the personage just the kind of character he pleases. Sometimes the model has no basis even in history, but is pure fiction, a pure ideal. Such is the process of the development of the child's character through the influence of example.

The secular moral education takes full recognition of the importance of this native tendency of imitation, and consequently tries to develop the child's character through biographical stories and the lives of some great historic personages. The chief defect of this secular moral education lies in its failure to find an actual and spotless personage to be the child's model. Perhaps it may depend upon creating an imaginary model; but this kind of model is never satisfactory, because human mind is made to perch on the real. The strength and influence of example lies in its actuality and reality. The more real a model is, the greater influence it exerts.

On the other hand, religious education, especially

the Christian education, presents to mankind a most perfect and inspiring Personage to be the Model of all men. This great Personage is embodied in Jesus Christ, Who is the incarnated Word and in Whom is embodied all the great truths of Christianity. His influence as a great example is immeasurable, because He is both human and divine. Moreover His actuality is supported by the hoary traditions of Christianity and the witness of millions of men. It is truly due to the incarnation of God in Christ that religious education is invaluable for the development of noble character. Thus we may again conclude that an ideal system of moral education is inseparable from religious education, because there is no other actual, perfect, and inspiring model except Jesus Christ.

IV. Religious Education--A Dynamic Factor in the Building of Noble Character.

We now reach the last phase of our discussion on the inseparability of religious education and an ideal system of moral education; and we shall show that this is the case,because religious education is a dynamic factor in the building of noble character.

Most of the ethical writers of to-day have begun to realize the importance of the dynamic factor in the building of character. Dewey, for instance, declares that character should be conceived as a system of working forces.[1] In most of the moral books, the importance of good intentions and many other things are stressed. But we know practically that the kind of character we hope to build up through the moral education is one that not only has good intentions, but insists upon carrying them out. Some moralists say that man has a certain primary equipment of impulse, of tendency forward, of innate urgency to do. The problem of education is that of discovering what this native fund of power is and then of utilizing it in such a way as to organize it into definite conserved modes of action.[2] But we find that the secular moral education, that is the moral education which excludes religious teaching, has not yet any adequate method whereby this "native fund" of power can be brought out for the development of dynamic character.

Religious education, on the other hand, has shown its usefulness as an invaluable educational

1 Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. 49.
Ibid., pp. 49-50.

force in the development of dynamic character because it appeals to ~~the~~ feeling and renders action more vigorous through the release of unused energies.

(1) Religious education appeals to feeling.

The importance of feeling as the driving force of conduct cannot be ~~too much~~ overestimated. Human history is full of illustrations of the influence of feeling in human life. It was not the intellectual convictions alone of Paul, Luther, Lincoln, or other men that have wrought wonderful reformations, but rather their ardor, their zeal, courage, sympathy; their hates and loves, their hopes and fears. In short, it was those stirrings of the soul which stand immediately behind the will as driving forces of action. There is much truth in Schiller's words, saying, "While philosophers are wrangling over the government of the world, hunger and love are doing their work."[1]

It is to this wonderful power of man that religious education appeals. There is hardly any fundamental feeling or instinct that is not related to religious teaching. Professor Bagley says,"The

1 Du Bois, Patterson, The Premiership of the Feelings, in The Sunday School Times, 44:15, April 12, 1902.

basic individualistic instincts (desire for life, fear of death, hope of reward, fear of punishment, yearning for happiness, dread of misery), the imperious sex, parental, and social instincts (desire of approbation, fear of disapproval, desire for the companionship of those that are near and dear, fear of banishment and ostracism), the adaptive instincts (delight in imitating forms and ceremonies, the pleasure of participating in the drama of ritualism, the comfort of satisfying instinctive curiosity concerning the mysteries of life and death),--all of these may be seized upon and turned to account by the institutions of religion, And perhaps the feeling of reverence, which is the crux of the religious experience, is to be looked upon as a resultant of these more fundamental impulse and emotions."[1] Thus we see a moral standard that is supported by religion possesses, in virtue of this support, an emotional force that very greatly increases its control over conduct. The Ten Commandments are fundamental rules of individual and social life. They are essential to the stability and perpetuation of society. If they were simply stated as principles or rules, the sphere of their

1 Bagley, Educational Values, pp. 173f.

influence would be almost neglibible. But give them concreteness and vitality by telling the dramatic story of their origin; regard them as the imperative commands of an all-powerful Deity; associate with failure to comply with their restrictions the most severe punishment, --and their appeal becomes universal.

(2) Religious education renders action more vigorous through the release of unused energies.

The fact that feeling rules the world and influences conduct is probably due to the abundance of unused energies that man has. Religious education renders action more vigorous by appealing to feeling,which releases these unused energies. Concerning these unused energies, Professor Wilm says, "There are in every man submerged and pent-up sources of energy which are rarely tapped and drawn upon, the higher degrees of possible activity being for some psychological reason pretty completely inhibited or broken."[1] Professor James describes in his essay, The Energies of Men.[2] "As a rule,"

1 Wilm, The Problems of Religion, p. 204.
2 James' Posthumous volume, Memories and Studies, pp.229f. Quoted by Professor Wilm in the work, op. cit.

he says, "men habitually use only a small part of the powers which they actually possess and which they might use under appropriate conditions. Most of us feel as if a sort of cloud weighed upon us, keeping us below our highest notch of clearness in discernment, sureness in reasoning, or firmness in deciding. Compared with what we ought to be, we are only half awake. Our fires are damped, our drafts are checked." We are also told that these unused energies can be released and their inhibitions removed by exitements, love, anger, and other strong feelings. As religious education deals with practically all of the fundamental feelings, the miraculous transformation of the character and degrading habits of the sinners in the time of religious conversion is due to the release of these unused energies. The admirable heroic deeds of unnumbered Christian martyrs were mostly due to the feeling that one is not waging the battle of life alone, but in allegiance with the supreme power in the universe. This feeling undoubtedly had released enormous amount of their pent-up sources of energy.

We have now shown that religious education is a dynamic factor in the building of noble character. We may depend upon this prosition as our final word proving the inseparability of an ideal system of moral education from religious education, because moral education remains very incomplete, if it does not or cannot help to develop noble and dynamic character.

Perhaps a word or two will reveal our final conception of the problem about the relationship of religious and moral education. There is a formal distinction between religious education and moral education, because the object of religious education is God, while the object of moral education is the world, and because religious education gives one a larger social outlook and ~~gives~~ more value to personality than does moral education. But they are intimately related; for we cannot understand the world without knowing God, and our social vision will finally reach the stage when all people will have a clear vision of the Kingdom of God. Moreover we find the intimate relation between religious and moral education is found in our conception of God, because both religious and moral ideals

are realized in God. Finally we find that moral education is very related to religious education, because it remains incomplete,if it does not relate itself to religious education.

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